The book The Right It by Alberto Savoia starts with a striking fact: 80% of new product launches fail. And in over 80% of cases, the product was built right and launched right—it simply wasn’t the right it. The market’s response? A resounding “MEH, not interested.”
The primary reason people build the wrong it is that they stay in Thoughtland for too long and begin testing their assumptions too late. This book offers a structured approach to finding the right it before you waste time and resources building it right.
In this article, I’ll share a personal experience of building the wrong it—and how I fell into all the traps described in the book. In Dutch, we have a saying: “Met de billen bloot gaan”, which literally translates to “to bare one’s buttocks”. In English, a better equivalent is “to lay it all on the table.” And that’s exactly what I’m doing here because I want to help others find and build the right it—and avoid the painful mistake of building the wrong one.
It can be uncomfortable to realize you’re investing in a product without tested evidence that there’s a real market for it. I’ve been there. But let’s bite the bullet and start testing now, before it becomes even more painful later.
The book presents a structured approach to validate ideas before full development:
Now, let me show you how I skipped these steps and built the wrong it.
My story begins with a board game called Lorrein, which my wife and I created out of our love for playing The Settlers of Catan. When we couldn’t find a new game we enjoyed equally, we assumed there must be a huge audience craving a similar experience. After all, Catan had sold over 15 million copies. Surely, countless players were looking for the next big thing.
So, we came up with the idea of designing our own board game. We already had a Market Engagement Hypothesis (MEH):
“If 10% of all Catan players go to their local board game shop and ask, ‘Do you have a game like Catan?’, and we can offer such a game, we’ll be rich!”
Did we test this idea? Yes—but poorly.
I visited a handful of board game shops and asked, “Do you get the question: ‘Do you have a game like Catan?’” Two shop owners said yes. That was enough for me. Confirmation bias kicked in, and I convinced myself there was a huge market.
We spent nine months working two evenings per week—four hours each evening—designing and testing our game. With woodworking, printing, and gluing, we built prototypes. It became our baby. We even secured Intellectual Property protection with IDÉPO.
When we finally launched at a contest and a local newspaper dubbed our game “The New Catan,” the small buzz fed our confirmation bias. We heard a few players say it was too complicated but paid more attention to those who loved it. Relying on compliments, ignoring criticisms, and not gathering numerical data all pointed to trouble. Although we asked interested players for email addresses (skin in the game)—our feeble attempt at market validation—we failed to verify whether these sign-ups would translate into sales. In the end, of all the people who shared their email address many bought the game, but the number of people who shared their email was not enough.
We were more receptive to positive comments than critical feedback. We read the critiques but saw no easy way to adjust the game. Instead of tweaking or reconsidering publishing, we pressed forward.
We should have looked at the market engagement numbers (MEH) and our own data (YODA) more critically. But it was already too late for an abortion—at least, that’s how it felt.
Winning second place out of three participants convinced us that the game should be published. At that point, we were emotionally and financially invested. And boy, did we invest even more after that…
From Prototype to Production – The Real Pain Begins
Transitioning from prototype to a finished product was a huge learning experience:
Multiple graphic design elements I did myself, but for the box design I wanted to onboard a professional graphic design company. With a staggering € 1.000,- budget the box was designed. Due to the low budget the design company hired an employee who just graduated from art school. Our idea about the design got lost in translation.
The biggest financial issue in board game production is economies of scale. Ideally, we needed to produce 15,000 copies to hit the right price point (€8 per game). But realistically, only 3,000 copies might sell in three years.
We settled for 2,000 copies, increasing our cost price to €13 per game—far too high.
We received the printed games one day before Spiel Essen, a major board game fair. Without a proper quality check, we had to sell them immediately to recoup our €1,000 booth cost. After four exhausting days, we didn’t even break even.
No matter what tricks we tried afterward, you can’t sell a product that is the wrong it.
We were left with hundreds of unsold games. Eventually, we donated:
While struggling to sell Lorrein, I developed another, simpler game called Tetteretet which later became SoundQuartett.
It was based on Go Fish (Quartet) but used animal sounds as a fun twist. This time, I tested the idea immediately:
Within days, shops contacted me, asking for more copies. This small but undeniable bit of “Your Own Data” (YODA) revealed real demand. I then demonstrated SoundQuartett at a local fair, where it sold out quickly, further confirming genuine market interest. Armed with evidence rather than assumptions, I approached Ravensburger, a major publisher. They loved the concept, made minor tweaks, and brought it to market across 10+ European countries, selling over 100,000 copies in no time.
Why such a contrasting outcome? With SoundQuartett, I didn’t rely on guesswork. I ran immediate, inexpensive experiments. Once local shops started reordering, it was clear that the concept resonated. According to the 5i Process—another Innovation360 method—moving from Ideation to Involvement (early user feedback) to Iteration gave me real signals about the potential success. By the time I approached a big publisher, I wasn’t just pitching an idea; I had data proving its viability
Why didn’t I publish it myself? I learned that being a game designer and a game publisher are two very different roles. What I truly enjoy is the creative process—coming up with ideas, refining them, and testing new concepts.
In Innovation Management, one of the key stages is Ideation, and this aligns perfectly with my strengths. In fact, Ideation is one of my CliftonStrengths Top 5, which means I naturally excel at generating and exploring new ideas. This realization helped me see that I’m more suited to creating games rather than publishing them. That’s why licensing the game to Ravensburger was the right choice.
My story aligns perfectly with the Innovation360 approach, which emphasizes that successful innovation isn’t driven by enthusiasm or guesswork—but by real, data-based insights. Through my work with Innovation360 Group, I’ve learned how to properly test hypotheses—not just on paper, but in the real world.
One of the key tools in the Innovation360 framework is the Market Readiness Assessment, which evaluates:
However, an assessment alone isn’t enough. For true validation, decisions must be based on Your Own Data (YODA)—not just desk research or Other People’s Data (OPD). It’s also critical to avoid “Thoughtland”, the place where untested assumptions create a false sense of confidence until reality proves otherwise.
🚨 80% of new products fail. And in most cases, it’s not because they were built wrong, but because they were the wrong product to begin with.
❌ Wasted investment – Money spent on development, marketing, and production.
❌ Lost time & missed opportunities – Months or years spent on the wrong idea.
❌ Reputation damage – A failed launch can make it harder to secure future funding.
❌ Emotional toll – Investing your heart into something that the market rejects
✅ Identify early warning signs before you invest heavily.
✅ Validate real demand with structured market testing.
✅ Avoid costly missteps by replacing assumptions with real-world data.
✅ Use the Market Readiness Assessment to guide your decision-making.
✅ Ensure you’re building The Right It—before committing time and money.
Are you currently building a product where ROI is determined behind a desk, based on assumptions instead of real-world data?
📞 Call me. It’s important.
Zwolle is an excellent location to start a business.
This video is an impression of Zwolle
Business-Developer Netherlands is a trade name of Sensalot
Chamber of Commerce number 08201456
V.A.T. number: NL001418171B85
Founded by Arthur Scholten on 01-07-2009
Find our general terms and conditions here: General Terms
Find our privacy policy here:
Copyright Business-Developer.nl © 2024